Peace Activism: An individual
Journey
Canada and a Canadian’s involvement in the Iraq
conflict
Donn Lovett
“one drop in the ocean, but each
drop can swell the tide”
Judy Small
It was fall, 1962.
I was 13 years old and the world was on the brink of a nuclear war. This time the given reason was the deployment
of missiles in Cuba
by the Russians. Something, apparently,
the United States
disagreed with. I remember those days as if they occurred last week. I spent six months of my life in constant
stress. If I slept, I had nightmares
about nuclear war. While awake I
constantly thought of nuclear war and the destruction that would result,
including my death. I remember the
federal Canadian Government Organization called the Emergency Measures Organization
(EMO), telling me that in the event of a nuclear attack while I was at school,
I should hide under my desk. Remember, I
was 13 and even at that age, I knew that “under the desk” was where they would
find the vapour from the nuclear explosion.
Provided of course, there was someone around to look for the vapour.
I remember one
particular Monday evening. I know it was
Monday because I delivered the Star Weekly magazine on that day. It was September in Winnipeg and after 6:00 p.m. when the sun was setting and the
street getting dark. Suddenly the air
was filled with the unprecedented sound of air raid sirens. I panicked and running to the first house I
could find, pounded on the door. The man
who met me immediately recognized my problem, tried to answer my stream of
questions quickly and attempted to calm me.
He put me in front of his television to show me that the sirens were
part of what the EMO referred to as a “mock nuclear attack”, and I should not be
afraid. How dare my government do this
to a 13-year-old child? They staged a
“mock nuclear attack”, sounding air raid sirens without warning. I knew I had to do something to prevent a
complete personal collapse. I sought
people with whom I could discuss these issues and who were already doing
something about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I joined a peace movement and learned what “one person can do”.
Also, vivid in my
memory was the fact that the Cuban Missile Crisis was solved, not because one
country attacked another, but rather as an outcome of dialogue. Yes, the Russians sent ships and the
Americans countered with more ships, but ultimately dialogue prevented a war
and the United Nations was involved in the solution. This message that I received from the events
of 1962 still resonates today. That is,
that dialogue is still the best way to solve disputes and the United Nations
Organization is needed more than ever.
My activism
carried me through high school and the Viet Nam War. The point is my activism was born out
of these events and the tumultuous 60’s.
In 1981 I found myself living in Baghdad
and working for a Canadian company called Canron. We were providing water pipe and fittings to Iraq
for the supply of drinking water. The
Iraqi regime had decreed that everyone in Iraq would have clean drinking
water and properly treated sewage. As a
Canadian company we were doing millions of dollars of trade in Iraq
and I was sent to administer the contracts.
My experience living among the people of Iraq and interacting with them was
one of respect, kindness and honesty.
When the Gulf War broke out and the U.S. talked about collateral damage
for the first time, I thought of my Iraqis friends, and so I saw the war from a
different perspective than did most North Americans.
I followed the
events in Iraq and learned
about the effect of the embargo on the people of Iraq and in particular to increased
infant mortality. My daughter was born
in December of 1990 and, being a ‘stay at home father’, I was deeply involved
in raising my child and – readily empathized with those Iraqis who were losing
their children at an alarming rate. Reports of the rise in infant mortality
rate and deaths of civilians were stalled by the U.S.
and U.K.
at the United Nations. They blocked
reports coming from the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF. Finally, the information could no longer be
hidden and the “Oil-For-Food” programme was initiated in an attempt to
alleviate the hunger to which years of embargo had subjected the Iraqi people.
We learned that
during the 1991 Gulf War the U.S.
led bombing raids that attacked every hospital, every water treatment plant,
every wastewater plant, most schools and every major intersection in downtown Baghdad in order to
destroy the water distribution and sewer collection systems. All attacks against civilian infrastructure
are in direct violation of the UN Charter and must be considered war crimes. A
good friend of mine, Denis Halliday, the former UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq
said the following “We are in the process of destroying an entire society. It is as simple and terrifying as that. It is illegal and immoral.”
The World Health
Organization (WHO), reported that “Pre-1990 Iraq reflects the health status of
a modern developing society, in which the wealth it obtained from exporting its
main commodity, oil, contributed to improving the quality of life of the Iraqi
people, which then (1988/1989), was already at a relatively ‘satisfactory’
level, with indications of a trend for further improvement.” UNICEF reported
that, “The Government of Iraq made sizable investments in the education sector
from the mid-1970’s until 1990. Educational policy included provision for
scholarships, research facilities and medical support for students. By 1989 the
combined primary and secondary enrollment stood at 75% (slightly above the
average for all developing countries at 70%). Illiteracy had been reduced to
20% by 1987. Education accounted for over 5% of the state budget above
developing countries of 3.8%.”
After the imposition
of sanctions in 1991 we know that:
- 1.5 million Iraqi civilians have died since 1991 as a
direct result of the sanctions.
- 600,000 of the dead were children under 5 years of
age according to UNICEF reports and substantiated by the Red Cross. A
recent UN report stated that the infant mortality rate in Iraq
is 133. This means that for every
1,000 children born, 133 will not reach the age of 5. By comparison, Canada’s infant mortality rate
is less than four.
- The number of malnourished children has increased
over 300% since 1991.
- Maternal mortality rates have more than doubled
during this period of the sanctions and 70% of Iraqi women suffer from
anemia.
- Unemployment has soared under the sanctions, as has
inflation. The average civilian salary, for example, is CAD$3.60 per
month.
- An estimated 800 tonnes of depleted uranium contained
in ammunitions were used by the allied forces in the Gulf War. Cancer
rates in Iraq
have increased five-fold since the Gulf War. Childhood leukemia in Iraq
has the highest rate in the world.
These undeniable facts lead me to
travel to Iraq to view first hand the devastation to the Iraqi
civilian population and the complete destruction of the civilian infrastructure
and the civilian economy. I could no
longer stand by and let the crimes continue, crimes to which the Canadian
government was a partner. Tacit approval
of the unjust conditions to which Iraqis were subjected was tantamount to
direct involvement in the destruction.
I began to contact
people I thought could give me information to help me develop a plan of action
to assist the people of Iraq. The first was Denis Halliday. I remembered reading a statement that Mr.
Halliday had made after he resigned his position with the UN in protest over U.S. interference in the relief operations in Iraq. He said, “I can find no legitimate
justification for sustaining economic sanctions under these circumstances. To do so in my view is to disregard the high
principles of the United Nation’s Charter, the Convention of Human Rights, the
very moral leadership and the credibility of the United Nations itself.”
Secretary-General
Kofi Annan appointed Denis J. Halliday, an Irish national, to the post of
United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, at the Assistant
Secretary-General level on September
1, 1997. Halliday served as such until the end of September
1998. During this period, the Security
Council Resolution 986 “Oil for Food” Programme, introduced in 1996/97 to
assist the people of Iraq
under the Economic Sanctions imposed and sustained by the Security Council, was
more than doubled in terms of oil revenues allowed. This enabled the introduction of a
multi-sectored approach, albeit modest, to the problems of resolving
malnutrition and child mortality. Mr.
Halliday resigned from the post in Iraq, and from the United Nations
as a whole, on October 31, 1998,
after serving the Organization for 34 years.
After running the
"Oil for Food" program, which uses Iraqi oil revenues to distribute
basic food rations and medical aid to Iraqi civilians, Halliday turned his
attention to spreading the word about sanctions-related suffering. I contacted
Mr. Halliday in late 1999 and invited him to Canada. We met in Ottawa for a series of lectures and I took
him to the House of Commons to meet the Chair of the Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bill Graham. I
wanted him to ask Mr. Graham to hold hearings on Iraq at the Standing
Committee. Graham agreed immediately and
the hearing was scheduled for March 2000.
I arranged for Mr. Halliday and Mr. Arthur Millholland the president of
Oilexco, the only Canadian company participating in the “Oil-for-Food”
programme, to come to Ottawa
as witnesses to the Committee. The
Hearings lasted for three days, culminating in Report #5, “Resolution on Iraq”, which was tabled in the Canadian House of
Commons on April 12th,
2000.
Report #5, which
was unanimously supported by the 18 Members of Parliament sitting on the
Committee and representing all five political parties, called for a de-linking
of sanctions. This meant the removal of
economic sanctions but leaving military sanctions in place. It further called for an opening of dialogue
between Canada and Iraq. The deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq
Aziz, accepted Report #5, as a good basis to resolve the situation in Iraq. It was suggested that the Secretary General
of the United Nations might use that report as a basis for breaking the impasse
on getting proper humanitarian relief to Iraq.
Report #5 was
rejected outright by the then Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, and it
died without being taken to the UN. The
main reason given by senior advisors to Axworthy, at a meeting that I attended,
were as follows. “While we recognize the
destruction to the people of Iraq,
we cannot do anything to upset the U.S. Administration because they will beat
us up on trade.” One of the senior
advisors was a medical doctor who had visited Iraq
and seen first hand the difficulties being experienced by the people of Iraq.
This resulted in
two important outcomes for me. I met
Madame Colleen Beaumier, the Vice-Chair of the Standing Committee on Foreign
Affairs, and I discovered that Lloyd Axworthy would not act if it meant
confronting the United
States.
I invited Madame Beaumier to come
to New York to meet with the Deputy Prime
Minister of Iraq,
Mr. Tariq Aziz. She agreed and the
meeting was arranged for September 2000 at the Iraq Permanent Mission to the UN
in New York. We discussed Report #5 as a basis to solving
the economic embargo on Iraq
while agreeing that at this stage the military embargo had to remain in
place. The meeting was cordial and it
was the first time that parliamentarians from Canada
and Iraq
had met since the Gulf War. By now Canada had closed its embassy in Baghdad even though Iraq
maintained a Charge d’Affaire in Ottawa.
The action now became one of getting individual MPs to endorse Report #5, in an
attempt to get a majority of the 301 MPs to sign a letter addressed to the
Prime Minister (and copied to the Foreign Minister) demanding that Canada
accept the results of the Report drafted by the Standing Committee assigned the
task of advising the Foreign Minister.
We received unanimous support from the Bloq Quebecois, the New
Democratic Party and the Progressive Conservatives, while individual members of
both the Liberal Party and the Alliance Party, led by Dr. Keith Martin agreed
to endorse the Report. We had the
support of 127 members when Parliament was dissolved on October 22nd, 2000 and an
election called. This nullified our
efforts until after the election.
A new parliament
was elected in November 2000 and we restarted our efforts to get Report #5
accepted by the Canadian Government.
However, we now faced a new resistance.
John Manley was appointed to the position of Foreign Minister and he
took an even closer stance with Washington. During Manley’s tenure Canada moved as close to Washington
as Canada
had ever been. This caused individual MPs in the Liberal ranks to distance
themselves from any initiative that may confront the U.S. We also witnessed a hardening of a
pro-American position with the Alliance Party, under their new leader,
Stockwell Day. Although we still held
the support of the Bloq, the NDP and the Tories, getting majority support was
becoming increasingly more difficult. This, combined with the election of the
neo-conservative Bush Administration, made the matter of getting a resolution
of the Iraqi sanctions almost impossible.
It became clear to me that removal of sanctions could not happen without
the return of the weapons inspectors and a resolution on the question of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), which became the buzzword of the Bush White
House.
At this time the
Bush White House had little or no interest in foreign relations. It seemed hunkered down in an isolationist
mentality until the attack on the World
Trade Center
in September 2001. The ensuing “War on
Terrorism” set a course for Bush and his neo-conservative cohorts that continue
to affect the world in a seriously negative way. The appetite for war,
demonstrated by Bush after the September attack, provoked me to call a meeting
of international diplomats and interested individuals, to meet in New York to see what we could do to dampen the US
enthusiasm for war. I contacted Denis
Halliday and Hans von Sponeck, both former United Nations Humanitarian
Coordinators in Iraq
at the Assistant Secretary-General level.
I contacted Scott Ritter, the former US Marine Major and head of the UN
weapons inspections in Iraq
from 1991 through 1998. I also asked the
former Foreign Minister of Canada, Lloyd Axworthy to join us, along with the
president of the Canadian oil company, Oilexco, Arthur Millholland. Lloyd Axworthy had had a change of heart
since leaving Ottawa
and wanted to see what could be done to ease the pressure on Iraqi
civilians. All agreed and a meeting was
arranged for the end of November 2001 in New
York, ironically held at the Republican Women’s
Center. Mr. von Sponeck could not join
us but was in contact via phone and email.
Although several
ideas were discussed, it became clear that the return of the weapons inspectors
was the only way out of the impasse. It
was thought that Canada
could play a role, given that it had an outstanding reputation at the UN and
was not an imperialist nation. Iraq
might accept recommendations coming from there.
However, John Manley was still Foreign Minister in Canada and not predisposed to anything that may
confront the U.S. We decided to continue discussions and to
formulate a plan that could be discussed between Canada,
Iraq
and the UN.
Lloyd Axworthy
agreed to discuss our meeting with Louise Frechette, a Canadian and the Deputy
Secretary General of the UN, and with Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, whom he was to meet with
at dinner while he was in New York and Washington. Conversations within the group continued over
the last part of 2001 and into 2002.
In January of 2002, Prime Minister
Chrétien appointed Bill Graham as the new Canadian Foreign Minister and hopes
for a more sovereign Canadian position with regard to the USA gave us a reason to quicken our attempts to
get the weapons inspectors back into Iraq. By this time Denis Halliday and Hans von
Sponeck were now concentrating their efforts in Europe. Arthur Millholland was in the UK and
busy with his business efforts. Lloyd
Axworthy became busy with his UBC institute.
It was left to Scott Ritter and I, to continue the discussions started
in New York
in the fall of 2001.
Scott Ritter
arranged to meet with the Labour Party in the UK and the French Government to
discuss the return of the inspectors. I
began to build support in Ottawa
with MPs with whom we could work.
Notably, Madame Francine Lalonde of the Bloq, Dr. Keith Martin of the Alliance, Joe Clark of the
Conservatives and Alexa McDonough of the NDP were contacted and they agreed to
keep in touch with the initiative.
Madame Lalonde became quite active and was a strong source of
support. I was in constant contact with
Madame Colleen Beaumier who gave us access to the Liberal caucus.
Meanwhile, I developed a
relationship with Robert Fry, the senior advisor to Bill Graham, the Foreign
Minister, as well as with Chris Hull and Graeme McIntyre from the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFAIT). Through Robert
Fry we could get access to the Foreign Minister if the matter was significant
enough. At this point we were feeling
quite encouraged and I asked the Standing Committee to meet with Scott Ritter
to discuss the return of weapons inspectors.
Thanks to the efforts of Madame Lalonde and Dr. Martin the Committee
agreed to meet with Scott Ritter and Denis Halliday in early June 2002.
The meeting with
the Standing Committee was very successful.
Scott Ritter was able to convey the importance of getting the weapons
inspectors back into Iraq
as a necessary step to getting the economic sanctions removed. There was a sense from the meeting that Canada
could play a role once the inspectors had returned. Scott Ritter and I then met with Madame
Lalonde to develop a document entitled “The
Honest Broker”. The thrust of this document was to ask Iraq to agree first to the return of the
weapons’ inspectors and then to permit Canada,
South Africa and Belgium to help mitigate any difficulties that
might arise between Iraq
and the UN as a consequence of the inspections.
These countries would not interfere with the inspectors themselves
because they recognized that the U.S. would not tolerate any
interference with the inspection process.
However, situations might have arisen requiring some form of
reconciliation between the UN and Iraq during the inspections. Canada was chosen because it is the major
trading partner of the U.S.
with a close historical, political and geographical relationship. South Africa
was chosen to represent the non-aligned nations and Belgium because of its membership
in NATO and the EU.
In August 2002,
Scott Ritter went to South Africa
to meet with the Tariq Aziz of Iraq,
Mr. Pahad, the Deputy Foreign Minister of South Africa, and the Belgium
Foreign Minister. During these meetings
it was agreed that Scott would go to Baghdad
to address the Iraq National Assembly on September 8th, and during
the presentation would discuss the return of the inspectors. South Africa
and Belgium agreed to
cooperate with Canada, if Canada
would take the lead on the “honest broker” initiative.
Meanwhile back in Canada, I stayed in touch with the Prime
Minister and the Foreign Minister to ensure that, at the very least, Canada
would continue to support the UN and not support US unilateral actions. On two occasions in July and August of 2002,
in direct phone conversations with Prime Minister Chrétien, I was assured that Canada
would keep supporting the UN. On August 9th, 2002
at a meeting with Bush in Detroit, Mr. Chrétien
reiterated Canada’s support
for a UN resolution to the Iraq
situation. At the same time I had met
with Minister Graham, who also assured me that Canada would stay with a UN
resolution. To this day they have
maintained that position and I believe that Canadians should be very proud of
these actions of our Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, in the face of the
tremendous pressure from the Americans to support their unilateral
actions. I was in the Canadian House of
Commons on March 17th,
2003 when the Prime Minister announced that Canada would not support the US war on Iraq. This was one of the bravest things our Prime
Minister has ever done.
Scott Ritter met
with the Iraq National Assembly on September 8th, 2002 and told them in no
uncertain words that they had to allow the inspectors to return and that there
was no room for negotiations on this matter.
Further, they had to advise the UN that they would accept the inspectors
before the U.S.
was able to get a resolution before the UN that they would not be able to deal
with. Iraq
accepted what Scott had to say and dispatched Foreign Minister Sabri to New York for September
14th.
While this was
being organized and unfolding, Bush was dragged kicking and screaming to the UN
on September 12th. This
happened through the efforts of a number of countries including Canada and the UK.
He appeared at the UN because there was virtually no support for U.S. actions against Iraq
and Bush felt that the U.S.
could beat the UN into submission. The
timing worked out for Iraq
who had agreed to come to New York for
September 14th and, through a series of negotiations in New York that I was
involved in, made its proposal to the UN through Kofi Annan on September 16th, 2002. The proposal allowed for a return of weapons
inspectors to Iraq
with no conditions attached. The
negotiations were finalized in November 2002 and that way was paved for Hans
Blix to return to Iraq
after 4 years without inspections.
The return of the
inspectors neutralized the U.S.
demand that Iraq
disarm. However, it soon became apparent
that the U.S. was not interested in a disarmed Iraq, but rather wanted control
of the country for several reasons, not least of which was Iraqi oil and the
fact that in their war on terrorism they had not been able to find Osama bin
Laden. The U.S. then moved to the language of
“regime change” and the world began to respond to their actions, culminating in
the mass rallies held worldwide on February 15th, 2003. Tens of millions of people protested the U.S. position including 1.5 million people in London, who opposed Tony Blair’s pro-U.S. stance and 1
million people in Rome, who opposed their
government’s support for the U.S. Spain
saw hundreds of thousands of people in Madrid
and Barcelona
protesting the Spanish government’s support of Bush. As a result, the U.S. changed its rhetoric from
“regime change” to “liberation of the Iraqi people and a change in human
rights”.
In January 2003 I
organized a parliamentary delegation to go to Iraq with the knowledge of Prime
Minister Chrétien and Foreign Minister Graham.
Madame Colleen Beaumier and her able assistant, Natalie Jewett joined me
on the trip. In Baghdad we met with the Deputy Prime
Minister, Mr. Tariq Aziz, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Naji Sabri, the Iraq Trade
Minister, Communications and Transportation Minister, Deputy Agriculture
Minister and the Deputy Speaker of the Iraq National Assembly accompanied by
several members of the Assembly. The purpose of the trip was to convey to Iraq the Canadian position with regard to
disarmament and to receive any message that Iraq wanted put before our
government. The Iraqis asked one thing
and that was for Canada
to maintain its position in support of the UN.
We arrived back in
Canada on January 29th, 2003 and
worked non-stop to try and reach agreement on an initiative that would prevent
the U.S.
from invading. This involved a two stage
proposal. Initially there was the six
point s for piece plan that was developed through the efforts of Scott Ritter
and the Deputy Foreign Minister of South Africa, Mr. Pahad and was an
extension of the Canadian initiative that was being discussed by the non
permanent members of the UN Security Council in February 2003. After the attack by the US and the UK
a modification of that plan which was now being sponsored by the Vatican
was tabled. Both of these proposals had
been somewhat agreed to by Iraq
and involved Disarmament, Human Rights, Democracy, Diplomacy, Economy and of
course Peace. These initiatives are
attached to this paper for review. But
as the entire world now understands the U.S.
and the UK were not
interested in a peaceful solution to Iraq.
The point of this
article is to let people know that anyone can make a difference. Although we failed in our attempt to prevent
the U.S. from invading Iraq
we accomplished great things during the past few years. Canada did not change its position
and support the US/UK war. Canada
maintained its support for the UN. We
met with several governments around the world and we felt we influenced their
decisions. And we must not forget the
events of February 15th,
2003 when the world stood up in the largest support for peace ever
experienced.
My 23 year old
daughter, Shanda traveled to Iraq
in 1999 as part of an international women’s conference. While in Iraq she visited several schools and
talked to children about the sanctions.
She was invited to meet with Madame Aline Chrétien and in December 1999
had a 90 minute audience with Madame Chrétien to discuss her experience in Iraq. More recently, my 12 year old daughter, Kate
visited the Iraqi Embassy in Ottawa
2 weeks ago to have a tea with the Iraqi Charge. My daughters have become anti-war activists
in there own right. I cannot forget the
undying support I receive from my wife, Nora Stewart. Nora is an engineer and a senior partner in a
large energy evaluation firm in Calgary. Without her absolute support I would not be
able to accomplish anything.
Our responsibility
now is to ensure that the US
does not become the judge, jury and executioner for the world. We shall overcome.
Prologue – September
2003
A great deal has
happened vis a vis Iraq
since this paper was written in April of 2003.
For our part a large group of activists and academics traveled to
Northern Cyprus on April 25th and met at the Eastern Mediterranean
University to discuss
what to do next. Out of those
discussions came the dream of Dr. Tareq Ismael to build the International
University of Baghdad (IUB). The initial
proposal was developed in Cyprus
and it was decided that the initiative should be a Canadian sponsored
initiative.
The IUB would
begin as a “virtual university”, meaning that the project will begin to get
underway in terms of establishing programs, international connections, and so
forth, even before it would acquire a physical presence in Iraq. Once established, however, it will be a
graduate-focused institution and would compliment post-secondary education in Iraq,
rather than compete in the post-Ba’ath environment. Not only will the university spearhead needed
educational programs, but it will also make available a wealth of educated
individuals capable of filling the “brain-drain” that resulted from the years
of war, militarization and sanctions. Before the U.S. and British-led attack
on Iraq, there were 10 universities in the country, but the quality of
education provided at these universities was in decline as there was not enough
funding available to run these institutions properly, principally due to the UN
Security Council sanctions and the choices made by the previous Iraqi
government to focus predominantly on militarization. Vast numbers of university professors and
professionals, such as doctors and engineers, left the country in the 1990s as
a result of the dramatic decline in social services. Now, largely due to the destruction and
looting incurred in the recent war and its aftermath, none of the universities
in Iraq
remain fully functional. This is a predicament that urgently
requires attention, as access to education has always been instrumental in
developing a lively and independent civil environment.
The established
universities in Iraq
will benefit greatly from an internationally-focused and graduate-centred
educational facility in their country. The IUB will be able to draw students
from all over the world to study in Iraq, alongside Iraqi citizens,
creating a constructive dialogue that is capable of transcending the
simplicities of international conflict scenarios. The breadth of experiences possessed by the
international students will enhance the resources and connections that Iraqi citizens
themselves would have, fostering greater civil society through an ever
increasing independence from governmental contacts. At the same time, the unique experiences of
the Iraqi students – historically, politically, economically and culturally – along
with the potential revival of a “cosmopolitan” Baghdad, will serve to enrich the
international students who would be studying at the IUB.
The planning committee has
already garnered a great deal of international recognition for this project,
including support from individuals such as Betty Williams, the Irish Nobel
laureate, and Jordan's Prince el-Hassan Bin Talal, brother of the late King
Hussein, who is acting as the chairman of the board of trustees. Furthermore, IUB advocates include Canada’s
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien; along with Edward Broadbent, former leader of
NDP; Richard Falk, professor of international law (Emeritus) at Princeton
University; and John Polanyi, winner of the Nobel Prize in chemistry and
professor of chemistry at the University of Toronto.
With the help of other
supporters, the IUB planning committee is also currently working to urge Nelson
Mandela, former South African President, to become a member of the university’s
board of trustees.
At this crucial
time when many Iraqis see any outside involvement as largely negative and tied
to an “occupation”, and relate to the
international environment in terms of “conflict”, the reconstruction of Iraqi
educational infrastructure through this project and others will help to provide
an example for the positive possibilities of international cooperation. Canada is in a unique position to spearhead such
a project and should seize the opportunity to foster positive development in Iraq
and advance our
traditional role as a peacemaker in the
international environment.
While in Ottawa over the past few
months we have had meetings with several MPs, Senators, DFAIT, CIDA and
potential partner agencies such as the Association of Universities and Colleges
of Canada (AUCC), the Canadian Bureau for International Education (CBIE) and
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).
To summarize the
rationale we presented in Ottawa for why Canada
should lead this initiative:
1.
Canada
has had a long-standing relationship with the Middle East and in particular
with Iraq. Prior to the Gulf War of 1991, Canada was one of Iraq’s
primary trading partners, and the Canadian Wheat Board was the largest supplier
of wheat to Iraq.
2.
Canada
is considered a non-imperialistic actor in the region. We have not had the expansionist policies of France, the United
Kingdom and the United States.
3.
Canada
has had a reputation as a Middle Power and a peacemaker in world affairs.
4.
The stance that Canada
took in the recent Gulf War of not supporting unilateral US action has reinforced Canada’s image in world affairs.
5.
Canada
can exercise a tremendous amount of influence in Iraq and the region by taking these
kinds of initiatives.
The question most
often asked by the people we meet is “What can we do to help with the project?”
You may contact me at
donn.lovett@gmail.com. I look forward to hearing from all of you and
your personal journeys.
